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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: The objective of this research is to identify and characterize the coordination systems 
used by SME hub firms that are in a situation of dependence with respect to other members of 
their network, taking into account the influence of hub firm size.  
Design/methodology/approach: Seven case studies were carried out: six innovation networks in 
which SMEs play a central role are compared with a “reference” case, in which the hub firm 
is a large company. 
Findings: Our qualitative empirical analysis of seven innovation projects showed that (1) the 
sharing of benefits and the guarantees that are implemented vary depending on the hub firm’s 
degree of dependence, (2) trust and recourse to formal agreements differ according to hub 
firm size, and (3) conflict solving is influenced by both hub firm size and degree of 
dependence.  
Practical implications: Results have important implications for the management of innovation 
networks which are increasingly important for the development of SMEs. The knowledge of 
the adequate coordination mechanims is central for a SME hub firm and the success of the 
innovation project. 
Originality/value: Investigations into the internal operation of inter-organizational networks have 
become increasingly common. Nevertheless, empirical studies are still rare, particularly in the 
field of innovation networks and even more in the case of networks set up by small firms. 
This article partially fills this gap. 
 
Keywords: coordination, dependence, small and medium-sized firms, hub firm, innovation 
network, size 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many researches have stressed the strong involvement of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) in innovation activities. These are often carried out as part of 
collaboration projects, especially within innovation networks (e.g. Batterink et al., 2010). 
However, empirical studies on the internal management and orchestration of innovation 
networks are scarce (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006), in particular as far as SMEs are concerned. 
Batterink et al. (2010) are the exception but they focus on external innovation brokers and not 
on hub firms. Most research has focused on the creation, the structure or the factors leading to 
the collapse of the firms.  
Such absence of research is all the more surprising that these organizational forms 
facilitate information exchange and the transmission of knowledge, which encourages 
opportunistic behaviour (Goerzen, 2007). This type of behaviour can be exacerbated when the 
hub firm is an SME, especially when these networks include (very) large size organizations. 
In their review of the existing empirical data on SME networking, White et al. (1996) have 
considered the relative costs and benefits of membership. The authors discussed the possible 
role played by network brokers in reducing these risks and supporting the development of 
mutually beneficial, growth-oriented relationships between high-technology SMEs. Very 
recently, Ngugi et al. (2010) advocated that further studies be undertaken in order to explore 
the relational capabilities of SMEs in wider relationships, such as within networks. In line 
with these studies, we focus here on innovation networks that are co-ordinated by small firms. 
Our analysis addresses networks including high-tech SMEs, but also those led by an SME – 
regardless of the nature and size of the network members. It also focuses on the capabilities 
that lead to the implementation of ways to improve coordination between the hub firm and its 
network members. More precisely, our goal was to identify how an SME can coordinate 
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network members and also to analyze the coordination arrangements that are implemented, 
especially when the small hub firm is in a dependency situation towards one (or more) 
member(s). 
Indeed, this link between a hub firm’s level of dependence, particularly when the hub 
firm is small, and the coordination mechanisms adopted by this hub firm has not yet been 
studied. Besides, research on coordination mechanisms has addressed the mechanisms 
individually (Das and Teng, 1998). Our study aimed to remedy this situation by analyzing the 
various coordination mechanisms set up within innovation networks where the hub firm is an 
SME. Indeed, asymmetry in size between the different network members tends to affect how 
alliance relationships are managed (Oliver, 1990) – even though size is not always associated 
with dependency. Our research thus departs from previous work through: 
- The analysis of several coordination mechanisms: empirical research has, until now, focused 
on one or two coordination mode(s). Theoretical research, for its part, provides conceptual 
frameworks including a variety of conceptual frameworks with various coordination 
mechanisms. These are quite complex however, making their operationalization rather 
difficult. 
- A detailed analysis of coordination mechanisms: we take a further step toward 
understanding the "mechanisms" by studying the various dimensions that they may adopt; 
- The identification of the impact of small size for hub firms and, more generally speaking, of 
the type of dependence on coordination mechanisms. Indeed, size asymmetry between 
members affects the management of alliance relationships. We thus answer the following 
question: Does the coordination mechanism differ depending on whether the hub firm is small 
or large? 
The objective of this article is to show that dependency and size are key elements in 
understanding the coordination mechanisms established by hub firms within innovation 
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networks. The emphasis is placed on hub firms because these hold a central position in the 
innovation network structure and take on a leadership role by channelling the network 
members' scattered resources and capabilities (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). They also possess 
some fundamental resources (patent and property rights) and have authority over the other 
members. The hub firm is also the organization that has established the largest number of 
links with the other network members.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant literature on 
innovation in SMEs, elaborating on the inter-organizational context of innovation. More 
specifically, we discuss the importance of SME-driven innovation networks, addressing how 
these networks are managed, the various coordination mechanisms a hub firm may adopt, and 
the difficulties linked to the SME hub firm’s dependency. In Section 2, the methodology of 
the empirical research is described. This section introduces the seven innovation networks 
that were investigated, and describes in detail how the data was collected and analysed. The 
seven innovation networks are then examined in order to compare the coordination 
mechanisms adopted by six networks orchestrated by an SME with a seventh network driven 
by a large firm. Section 3 discusses the findings from the cases and derives research 
propositions. The conclusion presents the limitations of the study and proposes avenues for 
further research.  
 
1. COORDINATION AND HUB FIRM DEPENDENCY IN INNOVATION 
NETWORKS 
Innovation in SMEs has been the subject of numerous studies, part of which addressed the 
question of why large firms and SMEs do not deal with cooperation and innovation in the 
same way. Indeed, SMEs have specific characteristics and often lack essential resources and 
capabilities to successfully innovate exclusively by means of in-house activities (Narula, 
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2004). This makes inter-organizational networks essential for SMEs innovation processes. In 
recent years, various national policies have endeavoured to boost firms’ innovation activities 
by stimulating inter-organizational cooperation among SMEs, often through cluster policies. 
Focusing on innovation networks established by SMEs, we present the main stakes of 
innovation networks for such enterprises (1.1), the various mechanisms a small hub firm may 
call upon in order to coordinate all network members (1.2). Also, as the hub firm is often 
dependent on some of the network members, we detail the sources of that possible 
dependence relationship (1.3).  
 
1.1. INNOVATION NETWORKS AND SMES 
Research has evidenced that some SMEs benefit from cooperation for their innovation 
processes, whereas others experience major problems. The positive effects include increased 
turnover, higher profit rates and expansion of the product range (De Jong and Vermeulen, 
2006). However, SMEs often find it difficult to establish and benefit from inter-organizational 
innovation projects. One of the reasons is that smaller companies cannot enforce their will 
upon others (Batterink et al., 2010). The distribution of the results is therefore a key issue for 
them. In addition, typically for SMEs, knowledge may unintentionally spill over to other 
organizations. Finally, inter-organizational innovation projects may involve organizations 
with diverging corporate and cultural backgrounds, thus leading to coordination problems. 
These usually increase proportionally to the number and diversity of the organizations 
involved. It is thus essential for a hub firm, especially an SME, to be well informed of the 
potential pitfalls of cooperation within networks, so as to mitigate these via appropriate 
coordination mechanisms. In their study of 164 Austrian SMEs, Hoffmann and Schlosser 
(2001) showed that coordination (such as a precise definition of rights and duties) is a key 
success factor of cooperative arrangements. However, SMEs often lack the capacity to fulfil 
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such key success factors for successful coordination and network management (Hoffmann 
and Schlosser, 2001). How then are such networks managed? This article aims to answer the 
following main research question: how does an SME hub firm coordinate innovation 
networks? 
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to these network orchestration processes 
aimed at innovation, and research has yet to analyze the contributions a hub firm can make to 
the network it orchestrates, despite its lack of hierarchical authority (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 
2006). In line with Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), an innovation network is defined as a set of 
vertical and horizontal relationships established between various organizations 
(public/private, partner/service provider) that are orchestrated by the hub firm in order to take 
advantage of its invention(s). The hub firm is the organization that has filed the patent(s) and 
needs to call upon a number of other companies in order to take full advantage of these. Its 
objective is to regulate the transactions within the innovation network (Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996) through the use of coordination mechanisms. 
 
1.2. COORDINATING INNOVATION NETWORKS FOR A HUB FIRM 
Coordination mechanisms are viewed as arrangements between economic entities, governing 
how these latter cooperate in order to develop an innovation project (Grandori and Soda, 
1995). The advantage of this definition is that it focuses on interactions on a strategic level, 
rather than on an operational level (such as the division of tasks or means of communication). 
Coordination within inter-organizational relationships can be achieved through five main 
mechanisms (Das and Teng, 1998; Grandori and Soda, 1995): the type of exchange, trust, 
sharing of benefits, guarantees and conflict resolution.  
Type of exchange. Members within an innovation network must lay out rules for acceptable 
behaviour, either formally or informally, in order to govern aspects such as how the results 
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will be divided, conflicts resolved, etc. (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Formal, explicit and 
written modes include standardized procedures, technical reports, analytical accounting, 
budgeting and planning methods, confidentiality agreements and contracts (Das and Teng, 
1998). Informal, implicit and verbal exchanges include the creation of joint teams (Grandori 
and Soda, 1995), seminars, meetings and staff transfers and decision-making methods. 
Informal modes are less costly, increase strategic flexibility and reduce the risk of conflict 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). However, they require more time to implement (Das and Teng, 
1998). In an innovation network, any delay in launching the product on the market may lead 
to that product being obsolete.  
Inter-organizational trust. It is defined as an underlying psychological condition that may 
be the cause, or the result of a specific behaviour (cooperation) or a choice (risk) (Woolthuis 
et al., 2005). Trust is often considered to have a direct influence on the success of 
partnerships, especially within the uncertain environment of an innovation project where trust 
can serve to predict the network members' behaviour (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In these 
networks, unforeseen events occur on a daily basis, making it hard for contracts to be fully 
comprehensive.  
Result division. An equitable division of results is often perceived as an incentive, 
encouraging project members to work harder, thereby improving the performance of an 
innovation project. On the other hand, an equal sharing of benefits can be seen in terms of 
uniformity and a lack of differentiation between the members of the project. Every member 
receives an equal share of the results, no matter how much they contribute in terms of 
resources and/or expertise (equal share in the results, regardless of the investment). This type 
of sharing is risky when the members bring unequal contributions as it can lead to the 
impression that the sharing of benefits is unfair.  
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Guarantee systems. Set up as prevention systems against opportunistic behaviour, they 
provide protection against potential damage by ensuring that it will be expensive for 
opportunistic members to withdraw from the network. Different guarantees have been 
described and financial integration is not the only way of ensuring members' loyalty. Other 
methods include logistic integration (control of capital flowing from a member), media-based 
integration (promotion of a brand that will be instantly recognized by all the network’s 
customers) and cultural integration (use of organizations that have a relationship with the hub 
firm that is not exclusively economic). Rubin (1990) suggested using reputation and/or 
specific assets. Future business opportunities also represent a guarantee, as the opportunistic 
member will experience a decrease in its future business in the case of withdrawal.  
Innovation networks do not always resort to guarantees. And guarantee mechanisms (direct 
and indirect) are not mutually exclusive : several guarantee mechanisms, especially when 
there is a high risk of opportunism, can be used. 
Conflict resolution. Within an innovation network, it is necessary to consider all interactions: 
two-to-two, one-to-several and several-to-several. Hence, if a conflict arises between two 
technical partners, another member of the network (most likely the hub firm) may intercede to 
resolve the issue. This type of situation has not been addressed in the literature. Conflict 
resolution mechanisms in innovation networks are complex, as is it hard to foresee how an 
innovation project will develop. Besides, the level of network members’ commitment is 
heterogeneous. Mohr and Spekman (1994) described six such mechanisms in bilateral 
relations. For the study of innovation networks, we have retained five (domination being 
considered as equivalent to coercion) : (1) Joint resolution of a problem: the different parties 
agree to work together in order to find a mutual solution to a problem, (2) Persuasion: one of 
the parties tries to persuade the other members that solution A or B represents the best way to 
emerge from a conflict situation, (3) Coercion: one partner forces the others to choose its 
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preferred solution for resolving the conflict, (4) Sanction: the network member is expelled, 
and (5) Introduction of a third party: recourse to arbitration (arbitrator or legal action).  
These five coordination mechanisms can be used by SME hub firms in order to 
orchestrate their innovation networks. Note that the specificity with innovation networks 
(compared to bilateral alliances for instance) is that these mechanisms have to be 
implemented with each member. However, the relationship between the hub firm and each 
member is different, not only because the members may operate in different fields (technical, 
financial, commercial, etc.), but also because the hub firm might be in a situation of 
dependence vis à vis some members, and not vis à vis others. Consequently, the question 
remains as to whether these coordination mechanisms vary according to the dependent or 
non-dependent relationship the hub firm has with the network member firms. 
 
1.3. SME HUB FIRM DEPENDENCY WITHIN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
Through networks, organizations seek to increase their respective power by gaining control 
over resource flows. Dependency arises from the hub firm’s need to maintain its relationship 
with one or more member(s) in order to achieve its innovation objectives.  
The resource dependency approach (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) proposes a unified 
theory of power at the organizational level of analysis which makes it possible to analyze the 
dependency relations that an SME hub firm has with some of the innovation network 
members. Organizations hold power over other entities when they control resources needed 
by these latter, they are also in a position to reduce their dependency on others with respect to 
resources (Provan et al., 1980). Power can be defined as the ability to impose one’s will onto 
others; the power of A over B is the ability of A to make B do something that A would not 
have done without the intervention of A (Dahl, 1957). The essence of power arises from one 
party’s dependence upon another (Blau, 1964).  
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Dependency has been the subject of multiple studies, especially concerning 
dependence towards customers (Raymond and St-Pierre, 2004), but not within innovation 
networks. In the latter case, a hub firm may be dependent upon several (types of) partners 
within the network. We investigated hub firms’ negotiating power and dependency according 
to five elements:  
Partner size. A larger partner generally has greater negotiating power in the inter-
organizational relationship (Oliver, 1990). In an innovation network including a small firm 
and a large firm, the first will often be in a position of dependency. Needing the additional 
resources provided by its partners creates a balance of power that is unfavourable.  
Partner resources. Each partner’s negotiating power is determined by the resources it 
provides, which can be either tangible (e.g., finance, skills, expertise) or intangible (e.g., 
reputation, network of relations). The type of resources provided determines a partner’s level 
of dependence, hence its power (Blau, 1964). Resources are key in complementary innovation 
networks in which the hub firm looks at having access to its partner(s) resources.  
Strategic importance of the project. The larger the proportion of the business taken by the 
innovation network, the greater the partner’s dependency on the other members (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) and the weaker its power. Hence, dependency is linked to the strategic 
importance of the project for the firm, which is supposedly greater for a small hub firm.  
Uncertainty. Power relationships are also linked to uncertainty, which can weigh upon the 
partners in terms of the unpredictability of their behaviour or the absence of complete 
convergence of their objectives (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). The existence of alternatives can 
make a partner’s behaviour unpredictable and reduce its dependency. 
The urgency of cooperation. The time factor also affects partners' respective powers within 
an innovation network (Weigelt, 2009). The absence of pressing time constraints is a 
considerable advantage in a power relationship. Members in an innovation network needing 
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to achieve results within a limited time frame will be at a disadvantage with respect to the 
other members.  
Having identified the main coordination mechanisms and sources of hub firm 
dependence, our objective is to explore how the mechanisms are used, and whether this use 
varies according to the type of dependency. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY OF SEVEN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
In order to answer our main research question (“how does an SME hub firm coordinate 
innovation networks?”) and to explore the potential relationships between coordination 
mechanisms and hub firm dependency, a qualitative case study methodology seemed the most 
appropriate methodology (Yin, 1994). Indeed, the objective was to gain a comprehensive and 
in-depth understanding of how coordination mechanisms were used and how they might vary 
as a function of hub firm dependency within innovation networks.  
 
2.1. METHODOLOGY AND FIELD 
The seven case studies constitute the theoretical sample (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). We 
selected cases that had the following common characteristics: the network was steered by a 
hub firm and was composed of at least three companies; the project was based on applied 
research and sought to develop a technological invention protected by a patent, design or 
model – as this research was limited to technological product innovations. We neutralized 
these four factors by choosing cases with these characteristics. In addition to the theoretical 
population, variety was a second criterion to be met in order to understand the phenomenon 
and its complexity. Several contextual variables were included with the objective of 
increasing result generalization: 
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- Number of members, used in most research on interorganizational networks (Ahuja, 2000 ; 
Goerzen, 2007): the studied networks had between 4 (Pinc&pile) and 55 members 
(Motorisation); 
- Geographic spread of the network, in order to assess the geographical proximity between 
members (local, national or international); 
- Size of hub firm and number of employees in the project (Reuer and Arino, 2007), in order 
to evaluate the importance of the project for the hub firm; 
- Previous experience of cooperation projects, as a company with a history of cooperative 
relations will have experience in managing such relationships (Nerkar and Roberts, 2004); 
- Resources and skills possessed by the hub, as it is important to consider the type of 
resources and skills possessed by network members (Goerzen, 2007); 
- Hub firm resources and skills  (Goerzen, 2007); 
- Sector of activity, in order to evaluate whether results vary according to the field of activity: 
the case studies concerned innovation projects in different sectors (sports and leisure, plastics 
and rubber, paper and packaging, automobile, and electrical equipment and electronics);  
These characteristics are factors that may influence the coordination mechanisms in an 
innovation network. However, no influence of these variables was detected in our case 
analysis (apart from the fact that hub firms look for complementary resources and 
competences when selecting of their partners). 
Fifty seven semi-directive interviews (Table 1) of one hour and a half on average were 
carried out with the project bearer and the financial, technical, industrial, commercial and 
legal members. They were designed so to address the coordination modes at work in each of 
the networks. This research was also conducted using internal (mails exchanged between 
project members, internal memorandums produced by the project leader, business plans, 
contracts, etc.) and external secondary data (Internet, hub firms’ websites, press articles). For 
 12
each case, we studied a variety of relationships between the hub firm and the various 
technical, financial, industrial, commercial and legal partners (about hundred relations1). 
Table 1  The seven innovation networks studied 
Project Hub firm M* Subject Business sector Characteristics I** 
Project A SME (12 people) 65 
Essential component 
for automobile 
manufacturers 
Automobile 
 
Ambitious project: high 
investment and very technical 13 
Project B SME (2 people) 8 
Product for 
beauticians 
(B to B) 
Large-scale retail 
Conflictual situation: the 
commercial and industrial 
partner was claiming 
property rights on the patents 
already filed) 
9 
Project C Independent (1 person) 11 
Product for every-
day use Large-scale retail 
Stagnant project: Oligopolist 
target market leading to 
distribution problems 
6 
Project D 
 
SME 
(3 people) 
9 
Machine improving 
the efficiency of the 
manufacturing 
process of small 
parts 
Industry 
Opportunistic behaviour of a 
commercial partner: 
complementary patent filed 
without notifying the project 
sponsor 
7 
Project E SME (6 people) 24 
Protection products 
for sports people Sport and leisure 
Project that is successfully 
moving forward without too 
many problems 
10 
Project F 
 
Independent 
(1 person) 
6 New practices in 
snow sports Sport and leisure 
The hub firm benefited from 
the experience of another 
project sponsor 
8 
Project G Large firm 7 High-technology 
engineering parts Industry 
Heavy and formal 
negotiations 4 
Total number of interviews 57 
* Number of members; ** number of interviews 
                                                 1
 For example, in project A, the SME hub firm had relationships with 29 technical members: 11 “partners” and 
18 “suppliers”. The lack of precision on the number of relationships examined is related to the complexity of our 
subject: most often, the interviewed persons spoke about a group of members (e.g., technical members) and not 
about specific firms. 
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For each case, a range of relationships was examined (approximately 100 in total2) between 
the hub firms and the technical, financial, industrial, commercial and legal members of the 
network.  
 
2.2. HUB FIRM DEPENDENCE  
The necessary acquisition of resources and skills was the most frequently encountered source 
of dependency (five cases: A, B, C, E and F). If a hub firm does not have all the resources and 
skills required to run a project (production equipment or distribution channels), it often has no 
other choice than to seek partners; the need for resources and skills then becomes a constraint. 
The strategic importance of the project has also consequences on the hub firms’ dependency. 
Three of the six hub firms (A, C and F) were created specifically to develop an innovation 
project and are therefore single product firms. If the project fails, the firm has no further 
reason to exist and will disappear. 
The urgency of the cooperation also affects the hub firms’ dependency. Hub firms A, 
C and D were developing innovations for which several other substitutable technologies could 
be developed. This meant that they had to get their products on the market very quickly in 
order to avoid seeing another technical standard take over. For example, for project A, the 
recent Government incentives aiming to encourage the development of energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly vehicles explains the boom in projects focused on developing hybrid 
engines, but not all of these projects will find a place on the market. 
In innovation networks, the number of members is an important parameter (Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe, 2006). Even when the hub firm is very small, it will not be dependent on all the 
members (size does not necessarily affect hub firms’ dependence). This aspect differentiates 
our research from previous work on the degree of dependency in inter-organizational 
                                                 
2
 The lack of precision in the number of relationships studied is due to the complexity of the subject of our study. 
The parties frequently referred to a group of members (for example, the technical members), rather than to 
individual firms. 
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relationships, which has generally been limited to studies of bilateral alliances. In all the 
cases, the hub firm depends on some partners, but not on all of them. 
 
2.3. COORDINATION MECHANISMS DEPENDING ON THE HUB FIRM DEPENDENCY  
We here present only the coordination mechanisms that varied according to the degree of 
dependence of the hub firm, i.e. division of results, guarantees and conflict resolution.  
Sharing the benefits. In innovation networks, two main types of benefits are to be shared: 
 Ownership and user rights for the patents and/or plans and models. How they are shared 
will depend on the size of the hub firm. A small hub firm will seek to keep most of the 
ownership rights, in order to avoid increasing its dependency on the other members. 
However, its small size is a weakness that makes it difficult for it to hold on to a majority 
of the rights;  
 Financial income that will be generated by the innovation project. Most hub firms propose 
to remunerate members via a system of recurrent royalties, payable on a monthly or 
quarterly basis. These royalties are usually calculated as a percentage of the generated 
turnover.  
When the hub firm is in a position of dependency with respect to the other members, these 
latter are indispensable to the success of the project. In most of the cases studied here, the 
benefits were divided equitably, as the members of the networks consider this mode to be the 
fairest. With this mode, there fewer conflicts arise over the sharing of benefits. If there is no 
dependency, egalitarian sharing is used, as long as the member has been part of the project 
from the beginning and has contributed as much as the hub firm. 
Guarantees. The greater the hub firm’s dependency, the greater its tendency to protect itself 
using direct guarantees. The withdrawal of indispensable members can jeopardise the future 
of an innovation project. Hub firms resort to direct guarantees in order to protect themselves 
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against opportunistic behaviour and to make it costly for members to withdraw from the 
project. 
Conversely, the less dependent the hub firm, the less frequently direct guarantees are used, as 
such guarantees generally take longer to set up (investment in specific assets, financial 
guarantees requiring the signature of contracts). They are also less worthwhile compared 
with the risk facing the hub firm. 
Conflict resolution. In our SME-orchestrated innovation networks, persuasion was the most 
commonly used conflict resolution method for dependent hub firms, as patents alone do not 
give a hub firm sufficient protection. In innovation projects, the hub firm is highly dependent 
on the other members because neither the technical feasibility nor the commercial viability 
has been proven and the hub firm must convince the other members of the value of its 
project. This partially explains why the hub firm accepts the conditions imposed by the other 
members – its small size and its dependency do not allow it to impose its own solution. Even 
if the hub firm remains an independent entity3, it must be prepared to accept the choices of 
the other members, or risk seeing the project fail. Conversely, when the hub firm is not 
dependent on the other members, removing a partner will be the preferred method for 
resolving disagreements. If members can easily be substituted, the hub firm will prefer to 
quickly change a partner before there is a significant transfer of resources and skills. 
 
2.4. THE MAJOR IMPACT OF HUB FIRM’S SMALL SIZE ON COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
The previous section highlighted the influence of hub firms’ degree of dependency on certain 
coordination mechanisms. This dependency not being linked to size, the direct impact of the 
hub firms’ size on coordination mechanisms is analyzed here. Three coordination mechanisms 
differ according to size: the degree of formalization, trust and conflict resolution. 
                                                 
3
 Our definition of an innovation network only includes independent organizations. Consequently, joint ventures 
were not included in this study. 
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Degree of formalization. Four of the six SME hub firms had no written agreements (except 
non disclosure agreement) with members they had already cooperated with, neither with 
substitutable members. On the other hand, the hub firms preferred to have written contracts 
with new members because they could not anticipate their potential behaviour. In general, the 
SME hub firms sought to reduce the degree of formalization, even if only because they did 
not have the legal resources to draw up the necessary documents. 
By contrast, large hub firms draw up detailed cooperation or service provision 
contracts, seeking to protect themselves as much as possible against potential opportunistic 
behaviour. In project G, contractual negotiations were long and each version of the contract 
had to be checked by each member’s legal department.  
Trust. The degree of trust varied according to whether or not the members had collaborated 
in the past. This trust is built up progressively through interactions and working together. It 
also depends on each member’s level of commitment. In project G, there is a priori trust 
between the three companies, even though they have never worked together before. Their 
reputations and their corporate image are sufficient to create this mutual trust. 
Conflict resolution. When the hub firm is an SME that is not dependent on its members, 
eviction is the most frequently used method for resolving conflicts. Conflicts arising from 
substitutable members are seen as threats to the long-term future of the project. Numerous 
confrontations occurred during the first few months of project G. Unlike the other six cases, 
their members could not easily withdraw from the project because they were under 
contractual obligations to cooperate. A majority of conflicts arose over the sharing of property 
rights between the industrial companies and the research laboratories. At first, the members 
met every month to discuss disputes and to find solutions. After failing to reach an agreement, 
the companies resorted to coercion to impose their view on the research laboratories.
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Hub firm size influences the degree of formalization, trust and conflict resolution, 
whereas the degree of dependency affects the sharing of benefits, the guarantees and the 
mechanisms used to resolve conflicts (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Key dimensions for coordination mechanisms  
Coordination mechanisms Key dimensions 
Degree of formalization Size (direct impact) 
Trust (or mistrust) Size (direct impact) (if no previous relations) 
Sharing of benefits Degree of dependence 
Guarantees Degree of dependence 
Conflict resolution Degree of dependence and size (direct impact) 
 
Table 3 presents the coordination mechanisms according to hub firms’ size and dependency.  
Table 3 Coordination mechanisms as a function of size and degree of dependence 
Network 
orchestrated by a 
large firm 
(no dependency) 
Network orchestrated by a small firm 
K
ey
 
di
m
en
sio
n
s 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
used by the hub firm 
Non-dependent hub firm  Dependent hub firm  
Si
ze
 
o
f t
he
 
hu
b 
fir
m
 
Degree of 
formalization: 
existence (or not) of a 
contract and number of 
clauses 
Very high: every 
large firm has its own 
legal department. 
Contractual 
negotiations are long 
(1 year) 
Moderate: the absence of an internal legal 
department means a firm has to use, and pay 
for, the services of an external supplier. The 
time taken to draw up contracts is short  
(1 to 2 months) 
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Degree of trust: (if no 
previous relations) 
Strong: even if the 
members have never 
worked together 
before, trust is 
rapidly built up, as 
the members of the 
network are large and 
have reputations to 
protect 
Weak to strong: trust is most frequently the 
result of previous relations  
Division of results: 
egalitarian or equitable 
Egalitarian: as long as the members have 
been involved in the project from the 
beginning  
Equitable: the results 
are divided on the 
basis of the 
contribution made by 
each member of the 
project 
de
pe
n
de
n
cy
 
o
f t
he
 
hu
b 
fir
m
 
Guarantees: ∅, direct 
and/or indirect 
Indirect (image and name recognition): 
The organizations involved in project G 
have a national, or even an international, 
reputation that could be stained by 
opportunistic behaviour 
Direct and indirect 
(future 
opportunities): the 
hub firm is only 
known locally and 
cannot rely on its 
brand image. SMEs 
favour sanctions 
against future business 
opportunities. 
D
ep
en
de
n
cy
 
a
n
d 
 
siz
e 
o
f t
he
 
hu
b 
fir
m
 
Conflict resolution: 
joint, persuasion, 
coercion, sanction, 
recourse to a third party 
(arbitration or court 
actions) 
Discussion then 
coercion: recourse is 
not made to the 
courts or to expelling 
members. Expelling 
certain members 
could have 
consequences in 
terms of receiving 
public finance  
Eviction : at the 
beginning of the 
project, as members 
have not yet carried 
out significant 
transfers of 
resources or skills, 
the hub firm will 
favour expulsion in 
the case of conflict  
Persuasion by the 
dominant member: 
thanks to its 
negotiating power, the 
strongest member can 
dictate its choices 
because the threat of 
its withdrawal could 
threaten the future of 
the project  
 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
By analyzing the coordination mechanisms that are involved (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006) and 
by explaining when different dimensions are used with respect to the type of hub firm 
dependency, this article has highlighted the important role that hub firms may play in 
orchestrating their innovation networks. The SME hub firm has a central role in establishing 
and managing the innovation network with the objective of completing an innovation project 
concerned with transforming a patented invention into a commercial success.  
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First, we underline the fact that small size is not always associated with dependency 
for hub firms. However, due to their small size, SME hub firms are rarely self-sufficient in 
terms of resources and skills (Park et al., 2002). This is particularly true in the early stages of 
an innovation project because the hub firm must prove that the project is both technically and 
commercially viable.  However, the hub firm’s small size has an impact on the level of 
formalism involved (which is low, cf. Jaouen and Gundolf, 2009), also on trust (high if there 
have been previous relations), and on conflict resolution (where a member’s exit is more 
difficult when the hub is large due to often strong contractual commitments). SMEs may 
choose not to rely on detailed contracts because they are costly to write up, to monitor, and to 
enforce. Consequently, if they have a history of prior relations with a member SMEs will 
prefer to rely on trust. These members are likely to have a greater awareness of the rules, 
routines, and procedures that they are required to follow (Gulati and Singh, 1999). We can 
therefore propose: 
P1: The coordination mechanisms adopted by an SME hub firm differ from those used 
by a large firm due to a lower degree of formalism, trust if prior relations and easier 
conflict resolution through member exit. 
 
Second, our research contributes to the resource dependency theory, which becomes a basis 
for testable empirical research through the identification and measure of resource dependency 
according to five dimensions. Of these, we have highlighted the major impact of hub firm 
size, as small size generally implies fewer resources, entailing major resource dependency and 
power imbalance. The degree of hub firm dependence, which depends on the type of member 
in these multi-stakeholder networks, has an impact on three coordination mechanisms: 
distribution of the results, guarantees and conflict resolution. When a hub firm is not in a 
dependent type of relationship, it will feel more secure and free to disagree on various 
subjects, including on the most efficient way to allocate joint resources (Kabanoff, 1991).  
With respect to conflict resolution mechanisms, Mohr and Spekman (1994) have shown their 
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importance for the success of a partnership. However, the authors did not study the elements 
which may affect the choice of coordination modes. In this study, we highlighted the key 
impact of the dependence level. If a hub firm is dependent, it will not be inclined to take the 
risk of loosing a partner and will therefore adopt “softer” conflict resolution modes. However, 
when the level of risk is high (for instance when a member is essential to the project), then 
contractual guarantees (Das and Teng, 2000) - called “direct guarantees” in this paper - will 
be implemented. In our case studies, a combination of direct and indirect guarantee was often 
observed. We thus propose:  
P2: The level of dependence of a SME hub firm will have an impact on three 
coordination mechanisms: result distribution tends to be equitable, guarantees of direct 
nature, and conflict resolution is usually achieved through persuasion. 
 
The above propositions can be summarized in the following conceptual model (cf. Figure 1): 
Figure 1 Conceptual model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our results bring major theoretical contributions. We show that, even when the hub firm is an 
SME (which tends to rely on informal communication modes), a single cooperation approach 
based on informal or tacit modes of exchange is unrealistic. Only one of our case studies 
presented a stable network exempt from conflicts of interest or power struggles. 
Disagreements and divergences of opinion between members are almost inevitable in 
 
Hub firm size 
 
Dependence level 
Trust 
Degree of formalism 
Conflict resolution 
Guarantees 
Result distribution 
 
P1 
 
P2 
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innovation networks. Conflicts of interest and rivalries over power preventing networks from 
operating smoothly (Miles et al., 1992), some formalization of agreements and coordination 
modes is a necessary step, even when members have a positive prior experience. This result 
has implications for theoretical research on trust-based relationships, which has often 
considered that trust can substitute for contractual engagements. Our results highlight that this 
is difficult to implement, even when partners know and trust each other due to previous 
satisfactory relationships (see the case of project D where the hub firm’s commercial partner 
took advantage of the situation by filing an additional patent). 
Our results therefore indicate that, for an innovation project-oriented product 
development, the "relational contract" (MacNeil, 1985) is not suitable. With innovation 
networks, contradictions and differences of opinion between members are almost unavoidable 
(Miles et al., 1992), and conflicts of interest and rivalries can often prevent the project from 
developing harmoniously. In such networks, in line with Poppo and Zenger (2002), a 
complementarity between contractual relationships and trust seems appropriate.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The present study investigated the influence of a hub firm’s dependency and size on the 
coordination mechanisms established within innovation networks. Analysis of seven 
innovation projects showed that (1) the sharing of benefits and the guarantees implemented 
vary according to the degree of dependence of the hub firm, (2) trust and degree of 
formalization depend on the size of the hub firm and (3) conflict solving is influenced by size 
and dependence. 
These results are important for SME hub firms: indeed, contrary to what is usually 
proposed for this type of firm (including concerning their dependence on other firms, mainly 
on large ones), SMEs may find themselves at the head of important innovation networks in 
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terms of the number of members and the nature of these members, some of which are 
multinational leaders in their field. Our research also demonstrates that SMEs are able to 
manage and orchestrate these innovation networks efficiently by implementing appropriate 
coordination mechanisms. Most of these mechanisms depend on the hub firm’s degree of 
dependence. For an SME hub firm, the choice of the appropriate coordination mechanism 
should thus be based on the type and on the degree of the dependence.  
Our study carries several limitations, which provide as many avenues for future 
research. We analyzed the specific context where the hub firm was also the organization that 
had registered the patent(s). We also used a schematic and simplified view – although the 
reality is highly complex – considering the degree of dependency and size as dichotomous 
variables rather than as continuums. Moreover, we analyzed the degree of dependence of the 
hub firm without studying the degree of dependency of the other members. Coordination 
mechanisms could also be studied within other types of networks (such as clusters or R&D 
consortia), allowing to verify their relevance in heterogeneous contexts. It could also be 
useful to study whether the mechanisms are affected when there are several hub firms (e.g.: an 
architect, a lead operator and a caretaker) within an innovation network (Miles et al., 1992). 
As the present study examined the influence of dependency at a given point in time, future 
studies could analyze how the degree of dependence evolves as the project advances as a hub 
firm’s dependency is not static and as initial asymmetry can be turned around.  
Our results have important managerial implications concerning how SME hub firms, 
through their managers, select the type of coordination mechanism they will implement. The 
framework provides guidance for more effective management in innovation networks. 
Managers should take into consideration the fact that coordination mechanisms are complex 
and are related to the degree of hub firm dependency and its size. Depending on the degree of 
dependency, a strategic combination of the five coordination mechanisms can be formulated. 
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More generally, this study calls for future work on this important topic in an innovation-based 
economy. 
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